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Abstract. Crowdsourcing platforms dedicated to work, be it paid or
voluntary, essentially consist in intermediating between tasks—sent by
requesters—and workers. They are used by a growing number of individ-
uals and organizations, for tasks that are more and more diverse, com-
plex, and that require specific skills, availabilities, experiences, or even
devices. On the one hand, these highly detailed task specifications and
worker profiles enable high-quality task assignments. On the other hand,
detailed worker profiles may disclose a large amount of personal infor-
mation to the central platform (e.g., personal preferences, availabilities,
wealth, occupations), jeopardizing the privacy of workers. In this paper,
we propose a lightweight approach to protect workers privacy against the
platform along the current crowdsourcing task assignment process. Our
approach (1) satisfies differential privacy by building on the well-known
randomized response technique, applied by each worker to perturb lo-
cally her profile before sending it to the platform, and (2) copes with the
resulting perturbation by benefiting from a taxonomy defined on work-
ers profiles. We describe the lightweight upgrades to be brought to the
workers, to the platform, and to the requesters. We show formally that
our approach satisfies differential privacy, and empirically, through ex-
periments performed on various synthetic datasets, that it is a promising
research track for coping with realistic cost and quality requirements.
Keywords: Crowdsourcing; Task assignment; Differential privacy; Randomized
response
1 Introduction
Crowdsourcing platforms are disrupting traditional work marketplaces. Their
ability to compute high-quality matchings between tasks and workers, instantly
and worldwide, for paid or voluntary work, has made them unavoidable actors
of the 21st century economy. Early crowdsourcing platforms did not (and still do
not) require strong and specific skills; they include for example Amazon Mechan-
ical Turk4 (for online micro-tasks), Uber5 (for car-driving tasks), or TaskRabbit6
(for simple home-related tasks—e.g., cleaning, repairing). Today’s crowdsourc-
ing platforms now go one step further by addressing skill-intensive contexts (e.g.,
general team building7, collaborative engineering8) through the collection and
use of fine-grained worker profiles. Such platforms carry the promise to facilitate,
fasten, and spread innovation at an unprecedented scale.
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Fig. 1: Our Approach to Privacy-Preserving Task Assignment
However abusive behaviors from crowdsourcing platforms against workers
are frequently reported in the news or on dedicated websites, whether per-
formed willingly or not (see, e.g., the privacy scandals due to illegitimate ac-
cesses to the geolocation data of a well-known drivers-riders company9, or the
large-scale exposure of workers’ identifying and sensitive information—e.g., real
name, book reviews, or wish-list—through Amazon Mechanical Turk IDs [12]).
The problem is even more pregnant with skill-intensive crowdsourcing plat-
forms since they collect detailed workers’ profiles for computing highly accurate
matchings (e.g., demographics, encompassive set of skills, detailed past expe-
riences, personal preferences, daily availabilities, tools possessed). Even with-
out considering fully the wealth of information in a worker’s profile, a detailed
set of skills together with the worker’s location can already disclose signifi-
cantly identifying and/or sensitive information (e.g., the only expert in fully
homomorphic encryption with advanced knowledge in hatha yoga from the
city of Rennes also has a strong background in alternative medicines for
alleviating the side-effects of chemotherapy may reflect a health status—
of the worker or of a relative—and be identifying). In some cases, even though
a worker’s profile does not contain any skill considered to be “sensitive”, this is
4 https://www.mturk.com/
5 https://www.uber.com/
6 https://www.taskrabbit.com/
7 https://tara.ai/
8 https://makake.co/
9 https://tinyurl.com/wp-priv
the act of participating to crowdsourced projects that is sensitive (e.g., a com-
pany may prefer that its employees do not participate to crowdsourced projects
in order to avoid any risk of disclosures). We advocate thus for a sound protec-
tion of workers’ profiles against illegitimate uses: in addition to the necessary
compliance with fundamental rights to privacy, it is a precondition for a wide
adoption of crowdsourcing platforms by individuals.
Computing the assignment of tasks to workers is the foundamental role of the
platform (or at least facilitating it). This paper considers precisely the problem
of computing a high-quality matching between skill-intensive tasks and workers
while preserving workers’ privacy. To the best of our knowledge, this problem
has only been addressed by a single recent work [8] (see Section 5 for other
related works). However, this work is based on costly homomorphic encryption
primitives which strongly hamper its performances and prevent it to reason
about skills within the assignment algorithm (e.g., no use of semantic proximity).
In this paper, we propose an approach depicted in Fig. 1 that addresses these
issues by making the following contributions:
1. A simple skills model for a worker’s profile: a bit vector and a taxonomy.
2. An algorithm run independently by each worker for perturbing her pro-
file locally before sending it to the platform. By building on the proven
randomized response mechanism [3, 18], this algorithm is privacy-preserving
(provides sound differential privacy guarantees [7, 19]), and lightweight (no
cryptography, no distributed computation, only bitwise operations).
3. A suite of weight functions to be plugged in a traditional assignment algo-
rithm run by the platform and dedicated to increase the quality of matchings
performed over perturbed profiles. Our weight functions reduce the impact
of the perturbation by leveraging the skills taxonomy, vertically and horizon-
tally, averaging the skills according to their semantic proximity in order to
reduce the variance of the differentially-private perturbation. The variance
reduction is mathematically sound and does not jeopardize privacy.
4. An experimental study, over a synthetic taxonomy and various synthetic
datasets, that shows promising preliminary results about the practical ade-
quacy of our approach from the sides of performance and quality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the notions
used in our approach and defines more precisely the problem we tackle. We
describe our algorithms in Section 3 and analyze them empirically in Section 4.
Section 5 discusses related work. Finally, we conclude in Section 6, outlining
interesting future works.
2 Problem Definition
2.1 Skills and Participants
We model below the three types of participants that interact together during a
crowdsourcing process as well as the information (i.e., skills) based on which the
interaction takes place (see Fig. 1).
Skills Model The set of skills that can be possessed by a worker (resp. requested
by a task) is denoted S. A worker’s profile pi ∈ P (resp. a task ti ∈ T ) is
represented by a bit vector, i.e., pi = {0, 1}|S|, where each bit corresponds to a
skill sj ∈ S and is set to 1 if the given worker has the given skill (resp. the given
task ti = {0, 1}|S| requests the given skill). Furthermore, we assume that a skills
taxonomy ST exists10 [13], structuring the skills according to their semantic
proximity, and is such that the skills in S are the leaves of ST (i.e., no non-leaf
node can be possessed nor requested). The non-leaf nodes of the taxonomy are
called super-skills. For simplicity, we omit here other kind of information (e.g.,
personal preferences, location, age) but we emphasize that our techniques can
be extended easily to support a wide range of information.
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Fig. 2: Example of a skill taxonomy ST
Workers and Requesters Both workers and requesters have storage, com-
puting, and communication ressources (e.g., typical CPU/RAM/bandwidth of
today’s personal computers); they differ from their privacy constraints. Indeed,
each worker has a private profile, while each requester has non-confidential tasks.
Without loss of generality, we consider that each requester has a single task and
that the number of workers and requesters is the same (i.e., |P| = |T |).
Platform The platform is essentially in charge of intermediating between work-
ers and requesters. It holds the set of workers’ profiles, perturbed to satisfy dif-
ferential privacy (defined below) and denoted P̃, as well as the exact set of
requesters’ tasks T .
Attack Model All participants, i.e., workers, requesters, and the platform, are
considered to be honest-but-curious. This means that they participate in the pro-
tocol without deviating from its execution sequence (e.g., no message tampering,
no data forging) but they will try to infer anything that is computationally-feas-
ible to infer about private data (i.e., the set of workers’ non-perturbed profiles
P).
10 In practice, skills taxonomies concerning numerous real-life contexts exist today
(see, e.g., the Skill-Project http://en.skill-project.org/skills/, or Wand’s taxonomies
http://www.wandinc.com/wand-skills-taxonomy.aspx).
2.2 The Traditional Tasks-to-Workers Assignment Problem
In a traditional context, where workers’ profiles are not considered private, the
objective of the crowdsourcing platform is to assign a worker to each task such
that the overall expected quality is maximized. This well-known combinatorial
optimization problem is referred as the assignment problem and can be expressed
as a standard linear problem [11] (assuming |T | = |P|). We define it formally as
follows:
Problem 1 (Assignment Problem). Given two sets, T and P, of equal size, and
a weight function C : T × P → R, the assignment problem is to find a bijection
f : P → T such that the cost function
∑
t∈T C(t, f(t)) is minimized.
Assignment algorithms rely on the weight function C : T × P → R in charge
of defining the cost of each assignment, i.e., the divergence between the re-
quirements vector of a task and the skills vector of a worker. Common weight
functions include the usual distance metrics (e.g., Hamming distance) or disimi-
larities (e.g., cosine distance). Numerous algorithms exist for solving the assign-
ment problem [1, 11, 13]. Since our approach is independent from the algorithm,
we simply use the Hungarian method [11], a standard academic choice. The
Hungarian method computes an optimal matching in O(n3) running time. In
a nutshell, it sets up all of the costs in a matrix, and uses a combination of row
operations and zero covers to come up with a min-cost assignment, resulting in
an optimal solution. We refer the interested reader to the original paper [11] for
further details.
2.3 Security and Quality
Security We say that our approach is secure against honest-but-curious par-
ticipants if and only if no participant learns information about the set of non-
perturbed profiles P that has not been perturbed by a differentially-private
mechanism, where differential privacy is defined below.
Differential privacy [5] is the current de facto standard model for disclos-
ing personal information while satisfying sound privacy guarantees. Informally
speaking, the differential privacy model requires that the outputs of a differentially-
private algorithm be almost insensitive to the participation of any possible indi-
vidual in the dataset input. Differential privacy is composable and secure under
post-processing.
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy [5]). A randomized mechanism M satisfies
ε-differential privacy with ε > 0 if for any possible set of workers’ profiles P and
P ′ such that P ′ is P with one additional profile (or one profile less), and any
possible set of output O ⊆ Range(M),
Pr[M(P) ∈ O] ≤ eε × Pr[M(P ′) ∈ O]. (1)
Theorem 1 (Compositions [14]). Let M be a randomized mechanism which
satisfies ε-differential privacy. Then: (1) executing M i times sequentially over
the dataset D, each time with a privacy parameter set to εi, provides (
∑
i εi)-
differential privacy (sequential composition), and (2) executing M over i disjoint
subsets of the dataset D, each time with a privacy parameter set to εi, provides
(maxi εi)-differential privacy (parallel composition).
Theorem 2 (Post-Processing [7]). Let M be a randomized mechanism which
provides ε-differential privacy. Let f be an arbitrary randomized mapping. Then
f ◦ M provides ε-differential privacy.
Quality The inherent information loss due to the differentially-private pertur-
bation impacts the quality of the worker-to-task assignment. This is the price
to pay to satisfy a sound privacy model. We quantify this impact by measuring
the relative increase of the assignment cost. The relative quality is the inverse of
this increase:
Definition 2 (Relative Quality). Let Ã (resp. A) be the assignment per-
formed over the set of perturbed profiles P̃ (resp. the set of non-perturbed profiles
P). We define the relative quality as follows:
qrel =
∑
(t,p)∈A C(t, p)∑
(t,p̃)∈Ã C(t, p̃)
(2)
We complement the relative quality with the fraction of profiles that have all
the skills required by the task to which they are assigned:
Definition 3 (Fraction of Perfect Assignments). Let Ã be the assignment
performed over the set of perturbed profiles P̃. We define the fraction of perturbed
assignments as follows:
fpa = 1/|Ã| ×
∑
∀i
(t[i] = 1 ∧ p[i] = 1) ∨ t[i] = 0 (3)
3 Flip-based Approach
This section details our approach. We first focus on the workers’ side: we describe
the algorithm that we propose for perturbing each worker’s profile, show its
adequacy to our context, and demonstrate that it complies with our security
model. Second, we shift to the platform’s side. We explain how to reduce the
impact of the differentially private perturbation (while still satisfying differential
privacy) and we describe the assignment algorithm based on perturbed profiles.
Finally, we overview technical means for letting workers fetch their assignment
in a secure way in order to complete it.
3.1 At a Worker’s Side: Local Perturbation
Building Block: Randomized Response Randomized response [18] is a sim-
ple though powerful perturbation mechanism shown to satisfy differential privacy
(see below). Basically, it inputs a single bit (e.g., the answer of an individual to a
sensitive boolean question) and flips it randomly according to a well-chosen dis-
tribution probability. We advocate its use in our approach for perturbing work-
ers’ profiles because it can be performed by each worker independently from the
others without any need for cryptography nor network communication (beyond
the necessary transfer of each perturbed profile to the platform). This would not
be the case with other well-known differentially-private mechanisms, such as the
addition of Laplace noise [5] for example, which require to aggregate data before
perturbing it (usually by centralizing it).
There exist multiple variants of the randomized response mechanism, some
of them in the context of differential privacy [7, 19]. We describe below the
variant, called innocuous question, we use in this paper and show that it satisfies
differential privacy11. Let x ∈ {0, 1} be a private value. The randomized response
mechanism simply outputs the perturbed value of x, denoted x̃, as follows:
x̃ =

x with probability 1− Prflip
1 with probability Prflip×Prinno
0 with probability Prflip×(1− Prinno)
where Prflip depends on ε (see below) and Prinno ∈ [0, 1]. We use Prinno = 0.5
in the rest of the paper, since it minimizes the variation of the estimated value
of x after perturbation (see [3] for more details).
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Fig. 3: Privacy budget ε with respect to the flipping probability Prflip.
Claim. For a given differential privacy parameter ε > 0, and a worker’s profile
made of a single bit to be flipped, the innocuous question randomized response
scheme satisfies ε-differential privacy if Prflip = 21+eε .
Proof. Let Pr[x̃ = u | x = v] (u, v ∈ {0, 1}) denote the probability that the
random output x̃ is u when the real attribute value x is v. The innocuous question
randomized response scheme gives the following probabilities:
11 Any other variant could have been used, provided that it satisfies differential privacy.
Algorithm 1: Flip (run by each Worker)
Input: The original profile p = 〈p[1], . . . , p[l]〉, the differential privacy budget
ε > 0.
1 Let Prflip be the flipping probability: Prflip ← 21+eε/l .
2 Initiate the perturbed profile: p̃← 〈p̃[1] = 0, . . . , p̃[l] = 0〉.
3 for 1 ≤ i ≤ l do
4 p̃[i]← RandomizedResponse(p[i], Prflip).
5 Return The perturbed profile p̃
(1) Pr[x̃ = 0 | x = 0] = (1− Prflip) + Prflip ∗(1− Prinno)
(2) Pr[x̃ = 0 | x = 1] = Prflip ∗(1− Prinno)
(3) Pr[x̃ = 1 | x = 0] = Prflip ∗Prinno
(4) Pr[x̃ = 1 | x = 1] = (1− Prflip) + (Prflip ∗Prinno)
In order to satisfy ε-differential privacy, we must ensure that Pr[x̃=u|x=u]
Pr[x̃=u|x=v]
≤ eε.
This translates into Pr[x̃=0|x=0]
Pr[x̃=0|x=1]
≤ eε and Pr[x̃=1|x=1]
Pr[x̃=1|x=0]
≤ eε. Given the randomized
response probabilities above and the value of Prinno = 0.5, the two unequalities
are satisfied (and maximized) for Prflip = 21+eε .
Flip Mechanism Our Flip mechanism essentially consists in applying the
randomized response mechanism to each binary skill of a worker’s profile before
sending it to the platform and inherits thus its high efficiency. Due to Theorem 1,
the privacy parameter εmust be distributed over the bits of the skills vector (i.e.,
divided by the number of bits) to compute the bit-flipping probability12. We
detail the Flip mechanism in Algorithm 1 and show that it satisfies ε-differential
privacy.
Claim. The Flip mechanism satisfies ε-differential privacy.
Proof. The proof follows the composition properties of differential privacy. First,
let consider that we have a single worker with a skills vector p of length l. We
showed above that perturbing (and sending to the platform) a single bit of p
with a flipping probability Prflip = 2/(1 + eε/l) satisfies εl -differential privacy. It
results from Theorem 1 that perturbing l bits of p all with probability Prflip =
2/(1 + eε/l) yields (
∑l
i
ε
l )-differential privacy, i.e., ε-differential privacy. Hence,
with a single worker, i.e., |P̃| = 1, the Flip mechanism satisfies ε-differential
privacy. Let now consider an arbitrary number of workers, say n. Since each
perturbed profile pi ∈ P̃ consists in a disjoint subset of P̃, then it follows directly
from Theorem 1 that the Flip mechanism applied in parallel by each worker
12 The Flip mechanism could limit the distribution of ε by sampling the skills vector
uniformly at random before perturbing it. The benefitial impact of sampling on
differential privacy has already been studied in other contexts [10]. We let the study
of this extension to future works.
satisfies maxi εi-differential privacy. Moreover, all workers use the same privacy
budget εi = ε, so that maxi εi = ε. As a result, the parallel execution of the Flip
mechanism by the n workers (i.e., |P̃| = n) satisfy ε-differential privacy.
3.2 At the Platform’s Side: Task Assignment
Algorithm 2: Match (run by the Platform)
Input: The set of perturbed profiles P̃ (bit vectors), the set of tasks T (bit
vectors), the weight function C : T × P → R to be used.
1 Initiate the final assignments Ã.
2 Perform the Hungarian method, based on C, for computing the task-to-worker
assignment: Ã ← Hungarian(P̃, T , C).
3 Return The assignment Ã
Efficient traditional assignment algorithms do not need any modification to
work with perturbed profiles, which are bit vectors, exactly as non-perturbed
profiles are. The Match algorithm presented in Algorithm 2 shows our straight-
forward use of the Hungarian assignment algorithm. The main question is the
impact on quality due to our perturbation, and this impact is naturally related
to the weight function C : T × P → R on which assignment algorithms rely. As
there is no clear consensus on what is a good weight function for task assignment,
in the sequel we recall several reasonable functions, ignoring or using the skill
taxonomy. We also propose new weight functions and explain how they could
cope with the diffentially-private perturbation.
Existing Weight Functions Numerous weight functions have been proposed
as metrics over skills. The Hamming distance is a common choice to compute
dissimilarity between two vectors of bits. The Hamming distance between two
vectors is the number of positions at which the corresponding symbols are dif-
ferent. However it does not capture the semantics of requirement needed for
crowdsourcing: e.g., a worker possessing every skills has a high Hamming dis-
tance from a task requiring only one skill, in spite of the fact that he is perfectly
capable of achieving this task. The weight function proposed in [13] adresses this
problem based on a taxonomy. We slightly adapt it and call it the Ancestors
weight function (AWF for short).
Definition 4 (Ancestors Weight Function (adapted from [13])). Let dmax
be the maximum depth of the taxonomy ST . Let lca(s, s′) ∈ ST be the lower com-
mon ancestor of skills s and s′ in the taxonomy.
AWF(p̃, t) =
∑
si∈p̃
min
sj∈t
(
dmax − depth(lca(si, sj))
dmax
)
(4)
Naive Skill-Level Weight Functions The Missing weight function (MWF for
short) between a worker and a task revisits the Hamming distance. It settles a
task-to-worker assignment cost that is intuitive in a crowdsourcing context: it
is defined as the fraction of skills required by the task that the worker does not
have (see Definition 5).
Definition 5 (Missing Weight Function (MWF)). MWF : T ×P̃ → R is defined
as follows:
MWF(t, p̃) =
∑
∀i
t[i] ∧ ¬p̃[i] (5)
Leveraging the Taxonomy In realistic contexts, the differentially private
perturbation may overwhelm the information contained in the original profiles
and make the perturbed profiles be close to uniformly random bit vectors (i.e.,
Prflip close to 0.5). With a naive weight function, Match would assign tasks
to random profiles, which would naturally result in random assignments. We
cope with this challenging issue by building on the taxonomy ST. Indeed, the
taxonomy allows to group large numbers of skills according to their semantic
proximity and to reduce the perturbation magnitude by using group averages.
Such a reduction is mathematically sound and formally assessed by the Bienaymé
formula [2]. Informally speaking, Bienaymé states that the variance of the mean
of a set of uncorrelated random variables decreases linearly with the number
of variables averaged. In our context this means that the more the number of
perturbed skills averaged together, the less the magnitude of the differentially
private perturbation (linear decrease).
We propose below two weight functions designed to cope with the pertur-
bation introduced by differential privacy by benefiting from Bienaymé formula.
Each leverages a precise type of information given by the taxonomy: the vertical
parent-to-children relationship between skills, and the horizontal neighbouring
proximity relationship. We stress that our two weight functions aim at illustrat-
ing simply the benefits of using these two relationships. More complex alternative
functions benefiting differently from the same information could be designed.
Climbing Weight Function The Climbing weight function (CWF for short) lever-
ages the vertical relationship given by the taxonomy by averaging, for each pro-
file, the skills along the root-to-leaf paths. In other words, before performing
the assignment, the platform converts each perturbed profile into a tree13, i.e.,
the same as the taxonomy ST , and for each node n of the tree, it computes
the mean of the skills that appear below n (interpreting the boolean values 1
and 0 as integers). For a given node, this mean is actually a rough estimator
of the fraction of descendant skills possessed. We call it score below. During an
assignment, given a task and a perturbed profile, the Climbing weight function
consists in computing the distance between the scores vector of the task and the
13 Converting the perturbed profiles in trees of scores can be performed in parallel by
each worker and be sent to the platform together with her flipped profile.
scores vector of the profile at each level, in weighting it by the level (the closer to
the leaves the larger the weight), and finally in summing the whole. The variance
reduction of the perturbation that Climbing is expected to benefit from is due
to the average computed within each score. For each given score, the reduction
is linearly proportional with the number of skills that it averages, which depends
on the taxonomy used, but grows monotonically and inversely linearly with the
level. Definition 6 formalizes the Climbing weight function.
Definition 6 (Climbing Weight Function (CWF)). Let vi ( resp. ui) denote
the scores vector at level i in the tree corresponding to the profile p̃ ( resp. to
the task t), and d : Rn × Rn → R be a classical distance function on real-valued
vectors ( e.g., Cosine). Then, CWF : T × P̃ → R is defined as follows:
CWF(t, p̃) =
∑
∀i
i× d(ui, vi) (6)
Touring Weight Function The Touring weight function (TWF for short) leverages
the horizontal relationship given by the taxonomy, i.e., the neighbouring prox-
imity degree between skills. As described in Definition 7, it returns the average
path-length— according to the taxonomy ST—between the skills required by
the task and the skills of the worker’s profile. The expected variance reduction
comes from the average path-length of the full cartesian product between the
skills required by a task and the skills set to 1 in a perturbed profile. The re-
duction depends on the taxonomy (similarly to Climbing) and on the number
of skills averaged.
Definition 7 (Touring Weight Function (TWF)). Let  denote the path-
length operator between two skills in the taxonomy ST . Then, TWF : T × P̃ → R
is defined as follows:
TWF(t, p̃) =
∑
∀i
∑
∀j(t[i] ∧ p̃[j])× (si  sj)∑
∀i p̃[i]×
∑
∀i t[i]
(7)
3.3 Post-Assignment Phase
Workers need a secure way to fetch their own assignment. This can be solved
easily by well-known technical means. For example, the platform could post
each assignment to a URI that would consist in the secure hash of the worker’s
perturbed profile. Each worker would then be able to access this URI based on
a secure web browsing (e.g., TOR14).
4 Evaluation
4.1 Experimental Settings
We evaluated the performance and quality reached by the MWF, CWF, and TWF
weight functions. We implemented several comparison baselines: the Hamming
14 https://www.torproject.org/
Fig. 4: Skills distribution of the Normal dataset over the Per-
fect34 taxonomy
weight function, the AWF weight function, and a random matching. Performance
is measured in terms of wall-clock time on a non-optimized implementation, and
quality is measured according to the Definitions 2 and 3.
We use a synthetic taxonomy (Perfect34) that we generated from a perfect
balanced tree of height 3 and branching factor 4, thus containing 85 nodes of
which 64 are leaves.
Our experiments were performed over three synthetic datasets. (1) In the
first dataset (Normal), the skills (workers and tasks) are randomly sampled from
the leaves of the taxonomy following a normal distribution N (
√
r cos θ,
√
r|sin θ|)
with θ randomly chosen in [0, 2π) for each profile, and r = 0.06, corresponding to
around 30% of skills per profile. The resulting distribution is given on Figure 4.
(2) In the two other datasets, the skills of each worker’s and task’s profile are
sampled uniformly at random in the leaves of the taxonomy at varying rates.
We call Bernoulli01 the dataset drawn from B(1, p = 0.01), and Bernoulli1
the one from B(1, p = 0.1). All the assignments were made between 100 workers
and 100 tasks.
The experiments presented in this paper were carried out using the Grid’5000
testbed15. All experiment were conducted on machines running Debian Jessie
(64-bits) with an Intel(R) Xeon(R) E5-2680 v4 at 2.4 GHz and 16GB of RAM.
The code was written in Python16 3.5.3 using NumPy17 1.12.0, SciPy18 0.18.1,
15 https://www.grid5000.fr
16 http://www.python.org
17 http://www.numpy.org
18 https://www.scipy.org
Weight function Time (s) Time complexity
rand 0.00099 O(1)
hamming 0.02467 O(|S|)
MWF 0.01969 O(|S|)
CWF 0.30395 O(|ST |)
AWF 1.99307 O(|S|2)
TWF 2.96748 O(|S|2)
Table 1: Wall-Clock Time of a Call to each Weight Function
NetworkX19 1.11, and JobLib20 0.10.4.dev0. Every experiment was run three
times, unless stated otherwise.
4.2 Performance
Our approach does not generate any network overhead since a perturbed skills
vectors has the same length as an original skills vector21. We consequently focus
on the wall-clock time taken to compute the weight functions. Table 1 shows
the average time among one thousand calls to each weight function, as well
as their asymptotic complexities. The taxonomy is Perfect34 and the dataset
Bernoulli1. We assume pre-computed lowest-common-ancestors and shortest-
paths, and that the distance used by CWF is linear in time. We observe that
these times are insignificant with respect to typical computation times of the
assignment algorithm.
4.3 Quality
Figure 5 shows the evolution of the two quality measures qrel and fpa, according
to the bit flipping probability Prflip, of the complete set of weight functions
and on the random matching, on the synthetic taxonomy Perfect34. First, let
consider the Bernoulli datasets. We observe globally that the weight functions
are rather robust against the differentially-private perturbation. TWF exhibits
a noticeable qrel measure equal to 0 on the two Bernoulli datasets. This is
actually due to the 0 cost of the unperturbed assignment which makes qrel
equal to 0 whatever the cost of the perturbed assignment. The later exhibited
a value similar to the cost of TWF on the Normal dataset. Given its high relative
quality, Hamming happens to be a robust metric. However, its fpa score is 0
(or close to) on the two Bernoulli datasets. This is not the case for the other
metrics on Bernoulli01, especially for MWF and AWF and except TWF. Second,
on the normal dataset the weight functions using the taxonomy (i.e., TWF, CWF,
19 https://networkx.github.io
20 https://pythonhosted.org/joblib
21 We note that though the length of a skills vector is unchanged, the Flip mechanism
could increase the entropy, thus reducing compressing capabilities.
Fig. 5: qrel and fpa for each weight function, with respect to Prflip, for the
Perfect34 taxonomy. fpa of non-perturbated assignments is dashed
AWF) have a relative quality close to 1 robust and achieve a reasonnable, similar,
fpa score.
5 Related Work
Privacy-Preserving Crowdsourcing A few recent studies have investigated
privacy issues in crowdsourcing task assignments [17, 8], but they suffer from a
strongly limited applicability either because they focus on a specific application
domain (data type, crowdsourcing process), or because their cost is prohibitively
high (rely on costly homomorphic encryption primitives). More precisely, first,
differential privacy has been used recently to build a privacy-aware framework
for spatial crowdsourcing [17]. This work enables a spatio-temporal task assign-
ment performed according to the current geolocation of the workers but without
disclosing it. It consists in computing a privacy-preserving spatial index over
the set of workers’ geolocations, and in routing each spatial task to the workers
that are currently physically close to the task location. Their framework does not
support the process and the data type that we consider (crowdsourcing based on
skills). Second, a private task assignment protocol was proposed in [8] which pro-
duces an optimal task assignment while respecting the privacy of workers and of
requesters. The protocol basically relies on the Paillier homomorphic cryptosys-
tem [16] for protecting workers’ profiles and the tasks. However, the overhead
due to the use of these cryptographic primitives make the method unable to cope
with realistic cost requirements. Indeed, our theoretical run-time analysis shows
that more than a century would be needed to compute an assignment between
a hundred workers and a hundred tasks.
Other Close Problems The approach proposed in [9] aims at protecting the
privacy of respondents during the surveys posted on a crowdsourcing platform.
Given a survey and an history of perturbed responses, a challenge lies in forming
the smallest group of respondents that will minimize the expected error according
to their past history. Their problem is thus different from our assignment problem
which results in the design and use of different families of algorithms. Similarly,
the high-level goal of privacy-preserving recommender systems [15] is close to
ours, but their problem is not the assignment problem (no bijection). The stable
matching problem consists in computing the optimal matching between two
sets such that each element in each set has its own matching preferences (i.e.,
an ordered list of elements of the other set). The canonical real-life example
is the matching between medical students and medical residency programs. A
recent work considers the security issues of the stable matching problem [4] and
proposes an elegant cryptographic solution for protecting the two sets to be
matched. However, in addition to being a different problem, they suffer from a
high cryptographic cost (e.g., over 18 hours to complete a matching with around
35K participants and 30K residency slots).
Alternative Randomized Response Mechanisms Finally, randomized re-
sponse mechanisms have been used in a variety of works but essentially as a
local perturbation method for gathering statistics while providing strong pri-
vacy guarantees. For example, the recent work [20] proposes to use randomised
response over bloom filters instead of raw bit vectors in order to enhance the
quality of the final statistics when the same population is repeatedly surveyed.
Our approach could use alternative randomized response schemes provided that
it satisfies differential privacy and can be performed locally by each worker.
6 Conclusion
We have described in this paper a lightweight privacy-preserving approach to
the problem of assigning tasks to workers. Our approach allows each worker
to perturb her skill profile locally in order to satisfy the stringent differential
privacy model without any need for additional communication or computation
cost. We have proposed novel weight functions that can be easily plugged in tra-
ditional centralized assignment algorithms, and that are able to cope with the
differentially private perturbation by leveraging the presence of a skill taxonomy.
Experiments performed over a synthetic taxonomy and synthetic datasets show
that our weight functions allow perturbed assignements to reach quality levels
close to non-perturbed assignments. Future works include collecting a large-scale
real-life skill dataset, and continue exploring the performance vs quality trade-
off by designing alternative profile perturbation strategies (e.g., collaborative
perturbation protocols).
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